Semantics and the Cold War

Talleyrand said, "Speech was given to man to disguise his thoughts." This was the remark of a clever man. For men of less intelligence, it would be truer to say, "Speech was given to man to prevent thought." Language has been performing this disastrous function throughout all the controversies of the Cold War. How well it has done this is my theme in the present article.

The general practice in Cold War controversies has been to choose pairs of words, one thought good and one bad in each pair, to attribute the "good" word to our side and the "bad" word to the other, and to avoid definitions which would show that the "good" word is not wholly applicable to either side and the "bad" word is not wholly inapplicable to either side.

I will begin with the words "defensive" and "offensive." It is the firm belief of both sides that their own weapons are defensive, while the weapons of the other side are offensive. The argument is as follows: Modern weapons can serve two functions. On the one hand, they can be used for a surprise attack, while, on the other hand, they can be used to deter a surprise attack if they survive in sufficient force to be still formidable in the hands of the side that has been attacked. The former use is offensive, the latter defensive. Our side (whichever that may be) would never engage in a surprise attack, whereas the other side might do so at any moment. It follows that all our side's modern weapons are defensive, and all those of the other side are offensive. The attitude on both sides has been made quite explicit on various occasions. A recent British Government pamphlet called The Key to Disarmament, in speaking of this matter, says: "It is irrelevant to say that the Soviet Union has no need to fear Western aggression--of course there is no such danger--or to argue that the Soviet Union would not launch an aggression against the West." I wrote in November 1957 an open letter to President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev (The Vital Letters of Russell, Khrushchev, Dulles, London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1958). Mr. Khrushchev, and John Foster Dulles on behalf of Mr. Eisenhower, replied using almost exactly the above arguments. In the Cuban crisis, the matter passed beyond argument. The Soviet Government asserted that the installations it was making in Cuba were purely defensive and were solely designed to protect Cuba from an attack by the United States. Those who took the Communist side pointed out that American installations in Turkey quite near the Russian frontier were claimed by America to be purely defensive. The Americans retorted that this was in no degree parallel to Russian weapons in Cuba, since the Americans would never initiate an offensive. If Khrushchev had not agreed to remove Russian weapons from Cuba, this semantic game might have continued until we were all dead.

The fundamental assumption which gives rise to such semantic disagreements is the assumption that our side is virtuous and the other side is wicked. John Foster Dulles' reply to the above-mentioned open letter (which was made on February 8, 1958, but doubtless would be made by many Americans today) was very explicit on this subject. He said: "The creed of the United States is based on the tenets of moral law. That creed, as well as the universal conviction of the United States, rejects war except in self-defense. This abhorrence of war, this determination to substitute peaceful negotiation for force in the settlement of international disputes is solidly founded on the religious conviction that guided our forefathers in writing the documents that marked the birth of America's independence." Khrushchev, as might have been expected, retorted by asking whether the Mexican War of 1846 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 were purely defensive. He went on (continued on page 206) Semantics (continued from page 175) to point out that at the time of the Russian Revolution a large number of countries, including the United States, had endeavored to suppress the Russian Revolution by armed force. He omitted to mention that the Soviet Government had used force to suppress revolutions in Hungary and Eastern Germany. Each side, by a careful choice of facts, represented itself as completely virtuous and its opponent as completely wicked. So long as this belief persists on both sides, the semantic controversy about the words offensive and defensive is bound to remain insoluble.

There is another set of words which had, originally, no good or evil connotation. The most notable of these is "red." In old days, when people talked of a "Red Indian" there was no implication as to his politics. Nowadays, if you belong to that small minority that is not willing to call a man a Communist unless he is one, you salve your conscience by calling him a "Red." The effect is equally explosive, and may do him almost as much harm. This shows what a useful word "red" is.

The West is in the habit of describing itself as the "Free World," while the East describes it as "colonialist." Neither of these words is in any degree accurate if intended to mark a difference between the two sides. The "Free World" is used to describe all the parts of the world which have governments supporting or allied with the United States. Portugal is deemed to belong to the free world although it is engaged in a bloody and brutal war against its African subjects. Spain is hailed as a defender of freedom although Franco's regime is at least as dictatorial as that of Khrushchev. And how about freedom in the United States itself? In America, it is illegal to be a Communist, and even slightly leftish views expose people to various forms of harassing persecution. The violence of popular prejudice (largely caused by semantic malpractices) makes juries ready to convict on quite inadequate evidence, as happened in the cases of the Rosenbergs and Sobell, and makes people accept the prolonged imprisonment of Sobell even when the evidence has been acknowledged to be inadequate. And how about Negroes in the United States? If you tell them that they inhabit a part of the free world, you will, if you are willing to listen, be met by a volley of devastating facts.

Internationally, also, it cannot be maintained that the United States stands for freedom. It does not admit the right of Cuba to have the sort of government which Cubans apparently want. In Southeast Asia, it supports unpopular dictatorships with hardly paralleled ferocity. Throughout Latin America, it pursues a similar policy, though so far with less savagery. It indulges in power politics with little practical respect for its professed slogans. Britain, in similar respects, has been at least equally blameworthy. The most blatant examples were Cyprus and the Suez expedition.

And how about the East and its slogans? The East accuses the West of being colonialist, but professes that the Soviet Government is out to liberate those large parts of the world which were formerly colonies of the West. The accusation against the West was, until recently, well founded. But what about Russia's record since the Revolution? All the non-Russian states of Eastern Europe, with the sole exception of Yugoslavia, were compelled to bend the knee to Moscow. I cannot see any difference between Russia in Hungary and France in Algeria, except that Russia was successful and France was not. When any country passes from subservience to one side to subservience to the other, the process is called "liberation" by the one side and "subjection" by the other without any regard whatever for the feelings of the inhabitants. It is very largely by the use of slogans that the truth of such changes of allegiance is concealed. Liberation is proclaimed on both sides, liberation "from Communist tyranny" on the one side and liberation from "the domination of Wall Street" on the other.

One of the most controversial and distorted words in the Cold War is the word "democracy." It used to be understood that democracy meant government by a majority of the population concerned, but this meaning was discarded by Communists at an early stage of the Russian Revolution when the Russian Constituent Assembly was dissolved by the Bolsheviks. Communists still speak officially of the "German Democratic Republic," although it was established by Russian armed force against the vehement resistance of the majority of the population. But in this matter the West is only slightly less culpable. Powerful forces--the government, the armed forces, the armament industry, the great preponderance of newspapers and television--are united in an endeavor to conceal from the public facts unfavorable to the interests of these organizations and to do what they can to spread beliefs which are contrary to fact, as, for example, about the possible efficacy of shelters against a nuclear war. Publicity is expensive, and, therefore, where there is freedom for the rich and powerful, publicity supports their interests as against those of the less wealthy part of the population. In the early days of socialism and communism, both stood for the interests of the poorer classes in their own countries. Nowadays, the Communists profess to stand for the poorer countries rather than poor individuals. The Western nations also profess to take this stand, though rightly or wrongly, with somewhat less success. The difference between East and West in regard to political freedom has come to be mainly a difference of method. Eastern governments are more prone to use force, while Western governments rely more upon deceit.

The word "peace" is used on both sides in a manner to promote their own propaganda. The Russians call their bloc "the peace-loving nations." The American Strategic Air Command has a large notice over its gate saying "Our Profession is Peace." As I see it, there is one very simple way of securing peace, and that is not to fight; but this is not the way that is suggested by either side. It is obvious to everybody that the most essential step toward peace is mutual disarmament. Each side has its own disarmament scheme, but hitherto each side has been careful to insert in its scheme something to which the other side is known to be unalterably opposed. It follows that each side only loves peace if associated with vital concessions by the other side. On such terms, everybody, always, has been in favor of peace. Even Hitler would have been if he could have secured all that he wanted without a war. The professed desire for peace, by both sides, one must conclude, has not been sincere. There is reason to hope that there has lately been improvement in this respect, but as yet this hope must remain somewhat uncertain.

The phrase "Iron Curtain," which is a favorite of the West, is resented by the East. The facts scarcely justify either the Western use of the phrase or the Eastern objection to it. The Russian Government on certain conditions welcomes parties of tourists from the West. There is no corresponding welcome for parties of Russian tourists in NATO countries. In fact, when emissaries from Communist countries, or anybody whose politics are disliked by the American Government, visit New York on official business of the United Nations, they are often confined to one part of New York City and forbidden to travel elsewhere in America. When Communist professional diplomats in England have occasion to go anywhere outside London, they have to notify the British police of their exact route and British policemen follow them to make sure that the information given is accurate. The Iron Curtain, like most curtains, has two sides, though from neither side is it quite impermeable. It is most nearly impermeable in the Berlin Wall. Nowhere in the West is the West's Iron Curtain called by this name--not even the curtain that it has hung about the Chinese mainland.

Behind the veil of propaganda and (concluded on page 251) Semantics (continued from page 206) the controversy between misleading slogans, the bare bones of the conflict are much simpler and much more traditional than they have been made to appear. We are told in the West that we must fight communism because it is "godless." But in the days of czardom, when Russia was as earnestly Christian as any other country, the British had almost the same hostility to Russia as they have now. This hostility lasted from the Crimean War until 1907, when British fear of Germany outweighed the previous fear of Russia. Propaganda in those days was more honest than it is now. British opposition to Russia was based upon the fear that Russia would drive the British out of India. British policy was unashamedly nationalistic and imperialistic. Nationalism and imperialism still inspire the policies of the most powerful countries, but both now have to wear a cloak of hypocrisy. It is considered more respectable to hate communism because it is atheistical than to hate it because it is depriving us of empire. But, in fact, nationalism is still the dominant force in politics. Creeds and ideologies are found to be a useful support of H-bombs, but they are not, in naked fact, causes of international hostilities. The root cause of hostilities is still the love of power. There is a certain difference of method between East and West. The West, being richer than the East, is better able to employ economic arguments in the shape of gifts, but the East is better able to respond by stimulating envy. There is, in fact, much less difference between Russia and America than is popularly supposed in both countries. In both countries, there is an oligarchy which, as a rule, is able to dominate policy. The Western oligarchy is more skillfully concealed, but very nearly as difficult to combat. The Western oligarchy is primarily economic. The Eastern oligarchy is political. It might be said with a considerable measure of truth that there is only one difference between America and Russia: In America the businessmen appoint the politicians, whereas in Russia the politicians appoint the businessmen.

How small a part is played by ideologies as opposed to love of power was shown by the course of the Second World War. At its beginning, Russia and Germany were united by the Hitler-Stalin Pact. When Hitler attacked Russia, Russia and the West became allies and remained so until the end of the War. At no stage did ideologies play a dominant part. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which similar changes might take place: For example, if the Chinese became so powerful as to threaten both Russia and the West, both would cease to hate each other, as they did during the Second World War.

The conclusion that is forced upon the impartial observer is that people enjoy quarreling. Governments and other powerful organizations have discovered this fact. Being determined to increase their own power, they must induce the public to believe what will support their policies. The constant use of words, meaningless in their context except as they have been repeatedly used with certain emotional overtones, is one of the most effective means of doing this. The public is emotionally satisfied and lulled, and the spread of what is called information increases the amount of what people think they know and at the same time diminishes the amount of what they do know. The process is largely unconscious and, for this reason, is difficult to combat. But the new facility for mass slaughter which science has unfortunately discovered has made misinformation and preconceived attitudes more disastrous than in any former age. The time has come for people to seek facts and to assess them afresh. Only so can the pleasure in quarreling be thwarted and kept in hand as it must be wherever it approaches the point of armed conflict. The only alternative is death.