Strike Teams

an inside look at those mysterious antiterrorist commandos who shoot first and count bodies later

Aloft over international waters, a highly excited, heavily armed skyjacker has forced his way into the cockpit of an American jetliner. While continuing to fly the plane in a normal manner, the captain activates a secret alert system. At a ground station, the message is received: Aircraft hijacked. Within seconds, the news is relayed to the Crisis Center in the basement of the White House. The duty officer lifts a red telephone. "Mr. President," he says, "we have a skyjacking." The U.S. is faced with the most delicate and dangerous problem that the world has to offer: how to rescue a planeload of helpless hostages on foreign soil from highly trained and utterly ruthless terrorists.

Until a short time ago, the U.S. would have been helpless. So would most governments. But the balance of power in the skyjacking war is changing due to the creation of elite antiterrorist strike forces, composed of highly motivated and superbly trained young men. The units are designed to tackle the terrorists on their own terms and to kill them.

Modeled on the men who operated quick hit-and-run raids behind enemy lines during World War Two, today's commandos are being schooled to perfection in the split-second art of storming aircraft, killing the terrorists and rescuing hostages unhurt. At their disposal are weapons ranging from the "stun" grenade and a specially modified Beretta automatic pistol to a futuristic .22-caliber submachine gun equipped with a Laco Laser target-acquisition device. The Laco fixes the aerial bandits in a red dot, marking the point where the bullets will strike. The commandos also possess eavesdropping devices so sensitive they can pick up even whispered conversations and the sounds of movement within an aircraft. And when the commandos want to deceive or distract the terrorists, they can bring into play an extremely varied collection of "dirty tricks" and deception gadgets.

The creation of such strike forces is a widespread international trend. But, beyond question, there are three undisputed leaders in the development of strike forces. Britain, which has the S.A.S. (for Special Air Services); West Germany, Group Nine of the Border Guard; Israel, the 269 Headquarters Reconnaissance Regiment. The three strike forces work closely together, countering the international cooperation among the terrorists with a trilateral teamwork of their own. They also provide advice and instructors for new units being set up in other countries.

But where does the U. S. fit into the antiterrorist scheme? The State Department has been delegated the responsibility for coordinating American antiterrorist activities abroad, yet it has failed to establish close working relationships with other allied agencies. The department's Office for Combating Terrorism, which is understaffed and underfunded, has had four directors in three years. The Pentagon, which is supposed to organize the U. S. Antiterrorist Force, exaggerates American capabilities. In Congressional testimony, the Department of Defense claimed it has at its disposal 6072 troops in 18 units capable of performing antiterrorist missions. That's an impressive figure. But it is wrong. Very few U. S. units have undergone any antiterrorist training whatsoever, and none has gone through the extensive schooling required for successful antiterrorist operations. As a remedy, the White House announced in May 1977 the start of what was then called Project Blue Light, a 180-man antiterrorist force patterned on the British, Israeli and West German units. The allied antiterrorist experts keeping tabs on the progress of Blue Light give the unit low marks. One major criticism is that it places too much emphasis on old-fashioned infantry training and not nearly enough on learning the sophisticated methods of recapturing aircraft. This becomes even more crucial when you take a look at the men with whom Blue Light is meant to deal.

Unlike the skyjackers in the U.S., who are usually unbalanced loners, the international ones are the product of a well-organized network to which some Western intelligence analysts refer as the Terrorist International. The network was established by an exceptionally gifted and diabolical leader, Dr. Wadi Haddad. A Palestinian eye doctor turned revolutionary, he masterminded just about every major international skyjacking since the onset of the epidemic in 1968. Early last year, Haddad, a cofounder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), died in an East Berlin hospital, reportedly of leukemia. He was buried in Baghdad with hero's honors. But he left behind many qualified successors and an efficient system--P.F.L.P. recruits, members of the skyjacking teams from far-left terrorist groups throughout Europe, Latin America and the Arab world. The Japanese Red Army, now completely a mercenary unit, often supplies killers. The trainees go through special schools, located in South Yemen and Iraq, where they learn, for example, how to cow airline passengers ("Speak in a commanding voice and crush anyone who opposes you" is the gist of one training). Practicing in mock-ups of jetliner cockpits, they are taught to read the fuel gauge and guidance systems so the pilot cannot deceive them by insisting he is too low on fuel to reach a certain destination or frustrate their plans by flying in the opposite direction. Moreover, the international terrorist network enjoys powerful backing from a number of governments, which supply funds, training bases and havens for the skyjackers.

In their clashes with the strike forces, the score so far is two to one against the terrorists. They lost--and badly--to the Israelis at Entebbe and to the West Germans at Mogadiscio. But they won decisively against the Egyptians at Larnaca on Cyprus.

There is no doubt that Terrorist International is extremely concerned about the development of the strike forces. Every six months or so, the representatives from the world's ten or 15 most important terrorist organizations get together for secret discussions. At the most recent meeting, held south of Nicosia in a Greek Cypriot village, the Arab delegates berated their European and Latin-American comrades for their failure to play a larger role in skyjacking. The implication is clear: It is becoming more difficult to enlist volunteers for what are developing into suicide missions. The assessment of one Israeli intelligence antiterrorist agent I interviewed is, "To understand how hard up they are, you have to know that the woman in a Ché Guevara T-shirt who was wounded at Mogadiscio came from the staff of one of Haddad's training schools. When the terrorists start reaching into their cadre for volunteers, they are in trouble."

Nonetheless, Terrorist International remains a powerful organization, and Haddad's successors are determined to avenge past failures. Without a doubt, American jetliners are major targets, and recently some ominous developments have been taking place inside the U. S. A number of pilot uniforms and kit bags have been stolen from New York--area airports, which could be a clue that someone is planning a jet snatch with terrorists disguised as members of the flight crew. Currently, flight-deck personnel do not have to pass through security check points. Hence, the question: Is the U.S. really capable of staging a rescue operation along the lines of Entebbe or Mogadiscio? If Blue Light confounds its foreign critics and develops into a first-rate force, the answer is yes. But Project Blue Light is top secret and, according to my sources, the outlook is not promising. However, if Blue Light does fail, or if a skyjacking situation occurs before the unit becomes operational, the President would be forced to turn to one of the other commando-style U. S. units.

The best-qualified unit is the Army's Black Berets, two battalions of Rangers stationed in Georgia and Washington State. The Black Berets were formed in 1974 to deal with especially hazardous missions during both war and peacetime. In war, their job is to kidnap or assassinate enemy leaders and destroy key targets far behind enemy lines, such as missile silos. In peacetime, their mission is to retake nuclear plants or oil refineries in the U.S. if they are captured by terrorists and to rescue American hostages held in foreign countries. If a U.S. Embassy, for example, were ever captured by terrorists, the Black Berets would be the ones to go. However, they have not trained nearly as intensively in the art of recapturing an aircraft as have other elite foreign units. But if the U.S. faced an international skyjacking, the State Department's chief antiterrorist expert, Anthony Quainton, would present the President with an operational plan to use the Black Berets as the assault force. They would try to offset the inexperience by drawing on the expertise of the British, the West Germans and the Israelis. Cooperation among strike forces is standard. A multinational force can be organized in a matter of hours.

The moment news of a hijacking reached Washington, the Black Berets would be put on alert and would begin planning and preparations. The mission would fall into one of two categories of the classic rescue operation: (1) the kind that occurred at Entebbe, meaning that the rescue force would face hostile forces on the ground and would have to fight its way in to rescue hostages; or (2) the kind that occurred at Mogadiscio, meaning that the government would turn cooperative after a cash payment and promises of future aid, and the strike force would face no opposition except from the terrorists. Although the West Germans deny it, highly placed intelligence sources tell me that Bonn gave the Somalian regime $25,000,000 as an inducement. And though it was never reported, Washington also promised arms shipments in exchange for Somalian cooperation.

If the operation were along the lines of the Entebbe assault, the Black Berets would require a larger, more powerful force, perhaps two full companies (380 men), with another company in reserve. The Rangers carry only light weapons (the M-16 rifle is their basic armament), so they would draw from the 82nd Airborne Division a heavy-weapons platoon equipped with antitank missiles and recoilless rifles. At the present poor state of American readiness, it would take several days, maybe even a week to assemble such a large force. By contrast, a Mogadiscio-style raid would require only 100 or so men and no heavy firepower.

Let's suppose an American Boeing 707 is hijacked and taken somewhere to the Middle East, possibly to a sheikdom along the Persian Gulf. I have chosen the 707 for two reasons. First, it takes a significantly larger number of terrorists to seize a jumbo jet and only three have been taken to date. Second, since so few jumbo jets have been hijacked (and none has been freed), there is no actual experience on which we can base a scenario. If the operation were like Entebbe, anything could happen. There is no way to predict the outcome of such a battle.

But intelligence sources have been able to brief us on a Mogadiscio-style operation in which we might stand a better chance of success. The Rangers would have the help of allied strike forces. While the troopers readied their equipment, the unit commander and the other officers would study the target area, aided by satellite photos, diagrams of the airport and topographical maps of the surrounding terrain.

The most valuable information the Berets could get, however, would come from the Mossad and AMAN, the Israeli political and military intelligence agencies. They know more about the terrorists' operations than any outsider. The Israelis would pass along information about the identity of the skyjackers, their likely behavior, the aims of the operation and the political situation in the sheikdom. Since the Americans have had little actual practice storming a plane, the White House Crisis Center would ask for guidance from Group Nine of West Germany's elite Border Guard. The Germans would probably send experts to join the Berets. The West Germans have studied more about seizing aircraft than anyone else and, as Mogadiscio proved, they do it superbly. They have practiced either on real models or on mock-ups of virtually every aircraft in civilian air service. Even the Soviets, who secretly provide aid to the terrorists, have, according to intelligence sources, furnished the West Germans with blueprints of their aircraft, so that Group Nine experts could devise means of entering and seizing them in case of a skyjacking.

In our scenario, taken from a variety of intelligence sources, about 100 Rangers would board a C-5A Galaxy, the huge Air Force troop and cargo carrier. En route, the men would probably clean their M-16s for the thousandth time. The Black Berets are always cleaning the M-16 with the best tool for that purpose, which happens to be a trimmed-down shaving brush. The Israelis even have a Hebrew name for the M-16, which translates as the gun that has to be shaved. The reason is that the M-16 tends to jam in dusty or muddy conditions. The Black Berets defend the M-16 as a good weapon if its firing mechanism is kept spotless. Nonetheless, it is a poor one for antiterrorist operations, since its plastic stock might break if used as a club in close combat. The Berets also spend a lot of time honing the cutting edges of their long knives.

The big C-5A would probably cross the coast of Israel at night and head south over the craggy red hills of the Sinai. It would certainly run without lights or radio contact and would finally land at a secret Israeli air base, located on the tip of the Sinai Peninsula near Sharm-el-Sheikh. The plane would quickly be guided to a parking area covered by a vast camouflage net to hide it from Soviet reconnaissance satellites.

In an underground bunker, the Black Berets would receive briefings by British and West German antiterrorist experts on the technique of storming the aircraft. Then Israeli armament specialists would supply the Beretta automatics to be used by the assault squads. Since the M-16 fires an extremely high-velocity bullet, it would not be suitable for action inside an aircraft, where ricochets and misses could kill hostages and riddle the aircraft, possibly even causing a fire or an explosion. The Beretta, as modified by the Israelis, fires a low-powered .22 slug that will kill at 30 meters or so if it strikes the victim in a vital area but is less likely to kill an innocent passenger or to pierce the fuselage.

An advance party would have surreptitiously landed in the sheikdom. It would probably be composed of British and Israeli operatives, a U. S. diplomat, an American aircraft engineer and a certain European psychiatrist who has specialized in the psychology of terrorists and frequently advises British, Dutch and West German antiterrorists.

The first step is to disable the plane so it can't fly. The old remedies of shooting out the tires or blocking the runway with vehicles are crude and not always effective. Approaching the aircraft from the rear so he could not be seen, the aircraft technician with the advance party would creep under a wing and drain out the hydraulic fluid. Then, even if he were ordered to, the pilot could not take off, for the landing gear and the flight controls cannot function without this fluid. Mechanically, the plane is dead.

The diplomat, however, would be our official representative. Following the advice of the psychiatrist, he would assure the terrorist leader that his demands were being met. For example, a terrorist might ask for Sirhan Sirhan and 28 terrorists jailed in West Germany, Italy and Israel to be flown to the sheikdom and exchanged for the hostages. The American would promise that a U. S. jet was already collecting the prisoners and that by dawn, the swap of terrorists for hostages could take place.

Will the leader believe this? Who knows? The important point is that such a terrorist desperately wants to think that the end of his ordeal is in sight. He would probably be about four days into the hijacking at that point. From debriefings of passengers, we have learned something about conditions aboard a hijacked jetliner after a few days have passed: clogged toilets, fetid air, rampant anxiety among the passengers (one old man actually went insane during a hijacking). Since the hijackers confiscate all handbags and carry-on luggage, women passengers using chemical contraception are denied the pill. This initiates a mass onset of menses. Sometimes the terrorists, wary of allowing the passengers to move about the aircraft, force them to remain in their seats the entire time, with predictably embarrassing results. In short, the terrorist leader and his captives alike would face unbearable conditions.

As the psychiatrist knows, the skyjacker rides an emotional roller coaster, plunging from crests of enjoyment and self-confidence to depths of doubt and despair. In fact, within a few short days, a terrorist travels all the way from heaven to hell. Like the Assassins of antiquity, (continued on page 191) Strike Teams (continued from page 94) today's terrorists spend a brief sojourn in their version of paradise. Sex and terrorism are intimately intertwined. Information acquired from Israeli sources who have interrogated captured terrorists and debriefed informers is that the main amusement before embarking on a mission is a grand orgy. The teams are often composed of an equal number of men and women, and they make the most of it. For a few glorious days, the terrorists have almost limitless funds, total leisure and nonstop sex. Before leaving Had-dad's training camp in Yemen on her first mission, a Dutch girl, who was arrested on a scouting mission in a plot to blow up the Tel Aviv Hilton, told my Israeli sources that her going-away party turned into a gang bang. Almost invariably, the women are passed around, and a few who have been captured and interrogated have complained of brutal and insatiable appetites of their male comrades.

But suddenly, the ecstasy of intercourse changes to the nerve-racking tension of the operation. As a rule, the terrorists are too keyed up to sleep the night before an operation and, of course, they must stay awake through its progress. After a couple of days, they begin to suffer from the combined effect of sleeplessness and the Benzedrine they take to stay awake. Personalities become unstable. Moods oscillate madly, imaginations go wild, mental concentration deteriorates. In short, these people need a psychiatrist. And they get one. Unfortunately, he is on the opposing side.

Because of his special insight into the mindscape of a terrorist, the European psychiatrist mentioned can, at least to a degree, manipulate the skyjackers. Generally, he does not speak to them but monitors the conversation between the plane and the tower and advises the negotiator on the approaches he should take. When the leader is feeling insecure, the psychiatrist seeks to extract concessions, such as the extension of a soon-to-expire deadline or the release of a sick hostage. When the leader is behaving aggressively or irrationally, he tries to calm and reassure him. As a general rule, he encourages the leader's illusion that the skyjacking will end in success and he pretends that he is trying to persuade his own side to cooperate. Above all, he seeks to convince the terrorists that they have nothing to gain and lots to lose, including the world's esteem, if they harm the hostages. The psychiatrist hopes to promote a bond of interdependence that sometimes--but by no means always--develops between captor and hostage. During the skyjacking of the Lufthansa 737, which was finally freed in Mogadiscio, the terrorists not only executed the pilot but also went through the cabin hitting passengers on the head with live grenades.

While the diplomat talks, British S.A.S. experts work on the plane itself. The British possess by far the most sophisticated systems for finding out what is going on inside the aircraft. The listening and recording devices that will pick up the conversation and movements of the terrorists inside the plane are attached to the underbelly of the craft. The terrorists, by the way, have no way of preventing this surveillance--and do not even know when it is taking place.

The S.A.S. men discover two vital facts: the number of skyjackers--let's assume there are four--and the pattern of their movements. They also learn about the terrorists' frame of mind, whether or not they are bickering among themselves, what plans they are discussing and how serious they are about carrying out the threat to blow up the hostages and themselves if their demands are not met.

By that time, the terrorists would be at their most dangerous; they would be on the verge of mental collapse. Despite reassurance, they would certainly suspect they were being deceived.

At Sharm-el-Sheikh, the Black Berets would have switched to an Israeli C-130, because that aircraft, unlike the giant C-5A, is capable of putting down quietly on a short, rough strip. Since it is imperative that their arrival not be observed by the terrorists, the Israeli pilot also would fly without lights and would maintain radio silence. On the final approach, he would peer at the runway through special "night-sight" binoculars similar to the Starlight scopes used in Vietnam. He would also be helped by radar reflectors (strips of thin metal) that the advance team would have placed on the runway. Bouncing impulses off these reflectors, the C-130's radar would give the pilot a fix on altitude and direction.

With the engines feathered, their huge windmill-like propellers turning slowly, the C-130 could touch down almost silently and roll to a stop well out of sight of the terrorists.

On a Boeing 707, the assault force would storm the plane through a total of five entry points, the two regular doors forward and aft on the left side of the aircraft, the forward galley service door on the right side and two over-wing emergency exits. Their faces blackened with combat cosmetics, the Black Berets would silently make their way to within 50 or 60 meters of the aircraft and then halt, taking cover any way they could, behind sand dunes or parked service vehicles. The supporting force, deployed in a circle about 100 yards from the plane, would be armed with M-16s and M-60 machine guns (a weapon capable of killing a man from shock alone--a hit on a toe can be fatal). The assault teams would carry the Beretta .22-caliber automatics provided by the Israelis.

S.A.S. experts underneath the Boeing would be monitoring the eavesdropping equipment through headsets. An expert in hostage negotiations would also listen in on the exchanges between the terrorist leader in the cockpit and our diplomat in the control tower.

Unlike the usual military operations, there is no preset zero hour for the type of assault we are about to witness. Instead, the Black Berets' officers and the S.A.S. men crouching beneath the aircraft must make the decision themselves. They weigh a complex set of factors: the frame of mind of the terrorists (are they alert or lulled?), their whereabouts (are they clustered in one place or scattered throughout the aircraft?), the condition of the passengers (do they seem calm and seated so they won't be caught in the fire fight?) and the strain of waiting on inexperienced troops (will they get too nervous?).

Moving in squads of five, the Black Berets run from their hiding places and take positions under the various doors. In each squad, one man carries a stubby lightweight stepladder and a second holds a metal cylinder that looks about like an aluminum beer can without a label. Actually, it is a stun grenade.

When the commandos conclude that the right moment is approaching, they give a signal that activates some extremely ingenious dirty tricks meant to confound and confuse the terrorists. For example, by cutting and splicing tapes of the terrorist leader's voice, completely new commands can be piped directly into the plane to confuse them. Ladders are placed against the fuselage and the wings. In five seconds or less, two men are at each entrance. Within another few seconds, they have opened the doors and hatches.

Many press reports have implied that the doors are blasted open, but that is not how it's done. All passenger aircraft are constructed so that in the event of a crash, rescue crews can open the doors, using levers on the plane's exterior. These emergency devices are built in a fail-safe manner, so that no malfunction within the aircraft can affect them. In addition to the outside levers, there are other means by which to open an aircraft from the outside, but the terrorists do not seem to be aware of them. Therefore, they must remain confidential.

As the doors and hatches pop free, Black Berets wrestle them open. A partner tosses a stun grenade into the cabin. A total of five grenades explode almost simultaneously in the 707, filling the plane with shock waves, a deafening roar and a blinding light. The grenade is in reality a giant firecracker composed of high explosives for the concussion and magnesium for the flash. The thin metal casing (some models use plastic or cardboard to contain the charge) disintegrates, reducing it to harmless particles. The blast is so great that its shock waves render the terrorists and passengers totally helpless for at least six seconds. But the troopers, wearing special helmets and goggles, are unaffected by it. As soon as the stun grenades go off, the two assault troopers at each entry leap in.

"Down! Down!" they cry. And any passenger with a grain of sense will hit the floor and hug it. The first troopers are followed by two more. The fifth man of each squad remains outside as coordinator and observer. As they spring into the plane, the Black Berets know exactly the positions the other troopers will take and do not fire in those directions. From S.A.S. guidance, they also know the locations of the terrorists, and the troopers begin firing into those areas, aiming at anyone who is standing.

Blinded and stunned, the terrorists might attempt to return the fire, but in the dark interior of the plane, the muzzle flash from their pistols would only give away their positions, and immediate counterfire from the rapid-shooting Berettas would cut them down. As the terrorists fall, the Black Berets rush them.

Meanwhile, other troopers help the passengers from the plane. They leave behind demolition experts, who enter the aircraft as soon as the shooting ends and defuse any explosives the terrorists have rigged aboard the plane. From the go signal to the emergence of the first hostage from the freed plane, the entire assault might take 60 seconds. This operation has been an unqualified success. But then, this operation exists only in the minds of Washington planners. What if a real operation were only a partial success, or even a failure? There is certainly no guarantee of success at present. Even if an assault unit managed to reach a skyjacked jet in time, the number of things that could go wrong is pretty formidable. Getting inside the aircraft would be the easy part. But at that point, anything could happen. The Americans, unaccustomed to close combat within an aircraft, might wound or kill some of the passengers with inaccurate fire. Passengers might stand up in fright and be cut down in the fire fight. If the terrorists were not killed or severely wounded immediately (remember, the stun grenade's effect lasts only a few seconds), one of them might toss a grenade that would kill or wound dozens of hostages. Worse, the leader might go ahead and blow up the plane. So far, terrorists have shown a marked reluctance to blow themselves up. At this writing, they have never, in all their scores of skyjackings, blown up a plane with anyone inside it. But, faced with certain death or capture by an assault squad, the terrorists might, indeed, decide to take everyone with them.

In addition, because it is so lightly armed, thin in manpower and lacking in reinforcements, an antiterrorist assault team is very vulnerable to unexpected developments on the ground. Exhibit A is the Egyptian army's antiterrorist team, known as El Saiqa (Lightning), which suffered terrible casualties on Cyprus in early 1978. The team, drawn from Egypt's 20 elite commando brigades, is given top marks by Israeli antiterrorist experts for training and esprit. The Lightning troopers proved their effectiveness in 1976 when they recaptured an Egyptair 737 from Palestinian guerrillas at the Nile Valley city of Luxor, near the Aswan High Dam. Lightning's catastrophic failure illustrates that even an experienced unit can run into disaster unless its intelligence is accurate, timely and encompasses all aspects of the situation.

A Western electronics specialist gave me the most thorough and up-to-date account of this operation yet disclosed. The background of the raid was political high drama. The Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) wanted to warn Egyptian president Anwar Sadat against making a separate peace with Israel. That warning was delivered in the form of automatic-weapons fire that cut down one of Sadat's closest friends, Yousef el-Sebai, in the lobby of the Nicosia Hilton. El-Sebai, editor in chief of Egypt's leading newspaper, Al Ahrarn, had been attending a conference of Middle East editors. As a means of escape, the killers commandeered a Cyprus Airways DC-8, hustled 11 editors aboard as hostages and took off toward the Persian Gulf. But no country would allow them to land. Remember, that was only five months after Mogadiscio, and even the more rabid Arab countries were cautions about befriending sky jackers. So the plane returned to Cyprus' Larnaca airport.

According to sources actually involved in the operation, Sadat, outraged over the death of his friend, secretly decided to send his antiterrorist unit to Cyprus to capture the terrorists and bring them back lor some quick Egyptian justice. But he failed to tell the Cypriot government of his plans. Instead, he sent only this cryptic communication: "Help is on its way." The Cypriots interpreted the message to mean that a high Egyptian official would come to participate in the negotiations with the terrorists. Meanwhile, to achieve the element of surprise, the Egyptian commando chiefs asked their Israeli counterparts to help trick Larnaca radar into believing their plane was not a military C-130 but a civilian Boeing. The Israelis, masters of electronic deception, masked the C-130's identity by "encasing" it in a microwave envelope that prevented Cypriot radar from determining the type of craft approaching. Consequently, the Israeli crew was able to claim it was piloting an Egyptair 707 and get permission to land. It rolled to a halt only 500 meters from the skyjacked DC-8.

But Egypt was caught off guard, too. Sadat and his antiterrorist advisors lacked a crucial piece of intelligence: A deal had already been struck between the P.L.O. and the Cypriot government--negotiated, according to the Mos-sad, by a Cypriot doctor who, besides serving the K.G.B. as a contact with the Greek Cypriots, is also a bagman for terrorist funds. The terms: freedom for the hostages in return for safe conduct of two terrorists to Lebanon. As a guarantee, the doctor sent a plane to Beirut, which fetched 14 heavily armed P.L.O. commandos who would be present at the exchange.

As the El Saiqa troopers began racing toward the DC-8, the P.L.O. contingent, evidently sensing a betrayal, opened fire on them from behind. Then all hell broke loose. The Egyptians began shooting. So, too, did the Cypriot National Guard, firing with Browning .50-caliber heavy machine guns from three directions. The lightly armed El Saiqa was chewed up by withering cross fire and the attack failed completely. Such a disaster could befall our own strike force if, for lack of accurate intelligence, it blundered into an ambush. No wonder an American veteran airborne colonel, who sometimes observes Black Beret training, is concerned. "I just hope they don't put those fellows in over their heads," he says.

So how do you create strike forces that will succeed rather than fail? To date, Blue Light is a tightly held secret and little is known of its training, but allied antiterrorist forces say it is weak on anti-sky jacking tactics. We know a bit more about the Black Berets. They have taken some lessons from our foreign counterparts. Selection plays a major role. They call themselves "the three--time volunteers"-for the Army, for the paratroopers and, finally, for the Rangers. But volunteering is not even half of it. Newcomers are put through extremely arduous testing. First comes a battery of psychological tests and a psVchiatric examination to eliminate candidates with unstable personalities and/or possibly homicidal tendencies. At that stage, the number disqualified is small, two or three percent at most. Then starts a period of intense physical and mental exertion that is designed to break all but the exceptional few. The Black Berets, for example, have what they call their RIP (for Ranger Indoctrination Program). And it lives up to its name. RIP lasts lor ten days, includes five parachute jumps and specializes in nonstop field exercises of the most trying sort, such as moving about for several days in swamp wilh water at times up to one's neck. A Black Beret must also be able to run five miles in 40 minutes, wearing combat boots.

The dropout rate at that stage jumps to about 90 percent. Seldom is a candidate actually told by his superiors he is unqualified. More often, the man realizes he cannot take the pressure and asks out. But if he does not ask out, his fellow trainees will tell him to get out. "I'd rather have only four men with me I can count on," a Black Beret sergeant told me, "than ten I am unsure of."

With their immaculately pressed camouflage uniforms and supershort hair ("one inch on top and white sidewalls"), the Black Berets seem somewhat anachronistic. Pleasant, polite, serious-minded, they strike an observer as a throwback to a less complex and more self-confident America of the Forties and Fifties. On the other hand, at this writing, the Black Berets have not yet been on a single actual operation.

By contrast, at this writing, the last reported raid by Israel's 269 commandos was against a P.L.O. small-boat base in Lebanon on March 2, 1978. Acting on an informer's tip that an attack was being planned, Israeli commandos destroyed two collapsible boats and shot dead two P.L.O. terrorists. The 269's action, however, did not prevent the P.L.O. raid from taking place; it only delayed it. Exactly eight days later, a team of 13 P.L.O. commandos landed undetected in Israel, but due to a navigational error, they went ashore near Haifa, about 50 miles north of Tel Aviv. Seizing a bus and hostages, they began a murderous ride south along the coast highway, firing at passing autos. Intercepted and defeated in a shoot-out near the Tel Aviv Country Club, one of the two surviving terrorists confessed that their target was once again the Hilton in Tel Aviv. The Tel Aviv Hilton is an impressive tower standing directly on the beach. It is also a symbol to the P.L.O. of American support for Israel.

Since then, the 209 most likely has been in action a dozen or more times, for it is the chief trouble shooter of the Israeli Defense Force. One day, the 269 may be conducting a long-range reconnaissance mission behind Syrian lines, the next day, fighting terrorists in Israel and the next, raiding a terrorist stronghold in Lebanon or Iraq. Among its exploits: the astonishingly bold helicopter snatch of a brand-new Soviet radar station from Egypt (Israeli and American experts wanted to study it). A revenge mission that blew up 14 Middle East Airline planes in Beirut. Major participation in the daring Mossad raid in Beirut that assassinated three Black September leaders, destroyed the P.L.O. bomb shop and damaged two terrorist headquarters. Troopers of the 269 staged the first successful recapture of a hijacked jetliner when they stormed a Sabena jet at Lod Airport in 1972. Still, the 269's most brilliant victory came at Entebbe, when it killed seven terrorists and 20 Ugandan soldiers and rescued 102 Jewish hostages. Since Entebbe was the turning point in the war against skyjacking, the 269 deserves special credit for having fough--and won--that crucial battle.

Of all the strike forces, the 269 is the most discreet. Its 1000 or so members wear no unit designation on the uniforms and, in fact, are forbidden to admit they serve in the unit or even that 269 exists. The location of its control base is a well-kept secret, but now members of the unit are being placed throughout the country so the 269 can react more quickly.

The intensity of the 269's training should be a model for our strike force: It never ceases. Israeli operations are choreographed as if they were a ballet. There are no wasteu movements and each phase is rehearsed and timed with a stop watch until the trooper can perform it to perfection.

In addition to becoming an accomplished paratrooper, each man must master the 269's special arts: sniping, sabotage, silent killing, evasive driving, electronics and communication, to mention a few. The trainee also learns to function as a lone operator, living for days under severe conditions. "They are trained to survive and achieve their missions at all costs, even if they have to carry on alone," a former 269 commander told me.

West Germany's Group Nine was created as a direct result of the disaster at the 1972 Olympics, when Black September began an attack on the Israeli Olympic team, killing two men and taking nine hostages. In a totally misconceived and stupid operation, six Munich police sharpshooters attempted to ambush the eight terrorists at Furstenlcldbriuk air base, as the Israelis sat bound hand and foot in two helicopters. First, the police were not even aware of the number of terrorists they had to deal with (six snipers against eight terrorists isn't exactly good tactics). Then, when they opened fire, they could not even shoot straight (half of them missed) and, as a result, the nine Israeli hostages were shot dead by the terrorists, who then blew up and burned the choppers.

The failure was unnecessary. Only 50 miles away were two superbly trained elite German army units, the Alpinists, who had the proper equipment and expertise to perform a successful rescue. But due to jurisdictional rivalries between West Germany's semiautonomous Lander (states) and the constitutionally weak central government, Bavarian and Munich authorities insisted upon using their own ill-suited police. The Alpinists were passed over again when Bonn decided to establish an antiterrorist force. Rather than use the Alpinist battalions, the West German government chose to create a new unit within the framework of its Bundes grenzschulz, or Federal Border Guard. Since there were already eight Grenzschulzgruppen, the unit was simply designated Group Nine.

Unlike the other strike forces, which are army units, Group Nine is essentially a police outfit, and it lacks the esprit and the tradition of the military. The green, slightly baggy Border Guard uniforms are reminiscent of forest rangers rather than commandos, and the officers and men mingle easily with a minimum of military-style formality. But what Group Nine may lack in military gang ho, it more than makes up in equipment and expertise. Provided with a liberal annual budget of $1,000,000, it is outfitted with a wealth of weapons, vehicles and electronic gadgets that makes Group Nine the envy of the other strike forces. Rather than having only one basic handgun and attack rille (as do the other units), Group Nine has at least two or three weapons in each category, so that the very best can be chosen for any given situation. The same applies to transportation; Group Nine owns everything from luxurious Mercedes 280SE sedans especially modified for stability at high speeds to a squadron of U. S. and French helicopters custom-made to Group Nine's high standards.

Alone among the strike forces, Group Nine places great emphasis on academic training. A typical day lasts 14 hours or more, with several hours spent studying law, criminology, psychology and political science, as well as keeping up to date on the developments within the terrorist movements throughout the world. One Israeli antiterrorist expert who visited Group Nine told me, "They eat and sleep terrorism."

Even so, regional and constitutional jurisdictions, as well as old rivalries, have kept Group Nine out of most of the real action. The unit has been forced to stand by helplessly while local cops and the federal criminal police attempt to cope with West Germany's urban terrorists. In fact, in the five years since its creation, Group Nine lias been in action only once--at Mogadiscio. Only 27 of its 180 members were involved and the entire assault and rescue operation, from the tossing of stun grenades to the complete evacuation of the passengers, took a grand total of six minutes. The crucial shoot-out lasted less than a minute. Understandably, the lack of action has frustrated the troopers. When a grateful woman passenger complimented a Group Nine member on the smoothness of the rescue, he shrugged oil the praise. "It should be," he growled. "We trained long enough!"

Visiting the Black Berets while they were on a full exercise among the scrub pines and swamps of Georgia, I gained the impression that they would rank among the finest antiterrorist troopers in the world if only they had the proper equipment and training. Sadly, they have neither. But they do have outstanding commando skills. The Black Berets are almost constantly on maneuvers, and once they enter the exercise area, they behave as if they were under actual combat conditions: Cigarette butts are field-stripped and buried, footprints along a trail are obliterated with the sweep of a tree branch, face and hands are smeared with black-and-green night-fighter cream, perimeter guards are posted. As an added bit of realism, they are also usually hunted by an "enemy" force, as I learned on my visit.

To reach the remote area of Georgia's Fort Stewart, where the Black Berets were training, I was given the use of the commanding general's helicopter. Coming in low, the chopper put me down in a clearing at the precise coordinates on the map, where' I was to be met by a Black Beret officer. But the helicopter, whose highly polished olive-drab exterior indicated it was no ordinary chopper, immediately caught the attention of a squad of regular enemy infantry searching the woods for the Black Berets. I had hardly met the officer before a strange white object fell about five or ten meters away. It was a practice hand grenade--practice or not, it exploded with a huge bang. We quickly took cover. The Black Beret officer tossed one back toward a line of bushes from which came the sounds of men moving about. In reply, a second grenade whistled down on our position, detonating a few meters from us. Then a voice called out, "You're dead!"

Defiantly, we did not reply. More sounds of men rushing about reached us from the tree line. Then clicks and assorted metallic noises. Next came the loud chatter of two machine guns accompanied by the sharp twang of M-16s. We were caught in an intersecting field of fire, and if our opponents had been firing live ammunition instead of blanks, we would, indeed, have been very dead.

Since the two of us were faced with impossible odds, the Black Beret officer stepped from our hiding place into the open and the troopers positioned along the tree line came eagerly forward to see what they had captured.

To their disappointment, they discovered they had not taken the general or even a Black Beret officer but just a visiting journalist who was immune from the war games, as was his escort officer.

"Oh, shit!" said one of the men. "I reckoned I had me a Black Beret, and I would've gotten me a day off."

Under an informal cease-fire, I went with the Black Beret officer down a clay trail that led alongside a dense pine woods. We jumped over a ditch and though my untrained eyes still could not detect anything unusual, we quickly encountered perimeter guards who were lying under bushes, M-16s at the ready. Most of the other men were stretched out under small nets that they had tied between the pines and festooned with pine needles and fern leaves to disguise their positions from the air.

Six Black Berets were sitting in a cluster of pine trees. While the high-ranking Army officers are reluctant even to discuss the topic of terrorism, the corporals and sergeants were eager to talk about the threat and their conversations indicated they had read on the subject and followed the news closely. They were acquainted with my book The Hit Team, the story of the Israeli revenge for the massacre in Munich, which was excerpted in the August 1976 issue of Playboy. They were curious about the foreign anti-terrorist teams and asked me about them. It was unfortunately evident that at the fighting man's level, they received little or no official information about our allies' efforts. I was pained to say how much better equipped and trained the other units were than our own Rangers.

The men chatted quietly about an exercise they had carried out the day before. It had been a raid on a small compound, built for training purposes in the huge expanses of Fort Stewart. The object had been to rescue two pilots captured by the enemy. "We got in and out before the guards knew what hit them," said a corporal, smiling. But the men were disappointed that helicopters had not been available for the operation; instead, they had had to use trucks. "That detracted from the realism," commented a sergeant. It really seemed an outrageous blunder that dedicated men like those would not be provided with the very best weapons and instruction.

Even so, when I asked the Black Berets if they felt they could handle a terrorist incident or a skyjacking, they seemed confident. "If we have the right leadership and planning," said a sergeant.

As we talked, I could not help but contrast in my mind the quiet confidence of the Black Berets with the ambiguity and confusion that still mars the Carter Administration's antiterrorist reports. After announcing the start of Project Blue Light, the White House seems to have lost interest. Meanwhile, the Pentagon continues to oscillate between a mindless optimism about American anti-terrorist capabilities and a refusal to be more specific about the true American capabilities. As far as combating terrorism goes, that is the worst possible position. And none of the ranking generals in charge of antiterrorism has had actual experience with the subject.

In reality, antiterrorist doctrine bears a strong similarity to nuclear strategy. Nuclear weapons are valueless as a deterrent unless the other side knows you have them and are willing to use them. The same applies to a successful anti-terrorist policy. Obviously, the terrorists should never be told the innermost secrets of an American strike force. But they should have no doubt whatsoever that one exists and that the White House would have the guts to use it.

Terrorist Warfare: Tools of the Trade

Terrorist wars are fought with the world's most sophisticated weapons, from common plastic explosives (composition C4) to Claymore mines that fire 700 steel ball bearings and can kill at ranges up to 250 meters. Mostly, though, the weapons are more "personal" than that. The arsenal on these pages constitutes but a sampling of the weapons used on both sides of this ongoing war--by terrorists and antiterrorists alike. Though not a comprehensive list, by any means, it is--in the opinion of firearms and terrorist experts--a good look at the most common light arms used in terrorist encounters.

The Bad Guy's

The Walther name was made famous by James Bond, who carried a Model PPK. Like everything else Bond carried, it was a quality piece of equipment. This 9mm P38, a German army pistol, is considered a general, reliable combat weapon. Although it doesn't have the "stopping power" of something like the big American .45, the Walther is in wide use and is considered by some to have better safety features than the .45.

Since Russia supports a great number of the world's terrorist activities, it's not surprising to find the Soviet Makarov in the hands of many hijackers and kidnapers. The Makarov was designed to be a personal-defense sidearm and isn't a very good choice as an offensive weapon. It fires a 9 x 18mm cartridge and is not very powerful--though at close range it can be quite effective.

Called "one of the most extensively used military pistols in the world today" in Small Arms of the World, this Canadian-made weapon was introduced in 1935 and remains a standard item for both sides. Also, one version of this pistol came with a detachable wooden shoulder stock/holster combination to turn it into a reliable firearm for long-distance shooting.

This tiny weapon--one of the earliest fully automatic pistols--is considered inferior by some firearms experts, but it is deadly at close range. It was designed by Miroslav Rybár for Czechoslovakia. The Skorpion fires the small, relatively low-velocity 7.65mm cartridge (muzzle velocity, about 1000 feet per second), but since it fires at a rate of more than 850 rounds per minute, it is extremely effective.

One of the reasons for the recent popularity of this German weapon is mere accessibility: More than 1,000,000 of them were made between 1940 and 1944. The MP40 was a refinement of the MP38, more popular because it was cheaper to manufacture and safer to handle. The cartridge is 9mm, which travels at 1300 feet per second. The weapon operates at about 500 rounds per minute.

"Although the early Stens had many shortcomings," according to Small Arms of the World, "they were just as effective in killing people." Apparently, the terrorists agree, since they've been known to use this British-made submachine gun, which has been manufactured in enormous quantities. It fires a 9mm cartridge at about 540 rounds per minute and is, consequently, a good close-range weapon.

This rifle was made by M. T. Kalashnikov, the same Soviet designer who created the infamous AK47 used by Viet Cong against American soldiers during the Vietnam war. The AKM was introduced in 1959 and, at 6.9 pounds, it is lighter than the AK47 (9.5 pounds). AK-series weapons are the most readily available small arms in the world: Some 30,000,000 to 50,000,000 have been produced and terrorists find them extremely easy to acquire.

Although Italy was the first country to put a pistol-caliber machine gun into regular use (the Villar Perosa in 1915), it's not particularly famous for its weapons. The rifle that killed John Kennedy was Italian, and some experts thought it wasn't capable of making those shots. On the other hand, the 9mm 38/42 was considered one of the best submachine guns in World War Two. It has a respectable rate of fire (550 rounds per minute) and is light and easy to use.

The Good Guys

This scaled-down submachine gun is a deadly, sophisticated American-made firearm designed by Gordon B. Ingram to take the .45-caliber ACP and 9mm Parabellum cartridges. It is also capable of accepting the Sionics noise suppressor (remember the mailman's silencer in Three Days of the Condor?). Due to the light weight of the bolt, the M10 has a firing rate of 1200 rounds per minute.

Because the enemy can't detect them until it's too late, snipers play a key role in antiterrorist raids. With the equipment pictured here--an American-made M21 fitted with a Sionics noise suppressor and a large scope--the sniper can lie in wait hundreds of yards away and kill a terrorist, often without endangering the hostages.

This British-made weapon is a 9mm submachine gun, and it is truly silenced. The thick casing at its front conceals 72 small holes drilled in the barrel to dissipate gases slowly. In a normal rifle, the gases would escape with explosive speed, causing a "blast" sound. Furthermore, the Sterling fires a subsonic round (1000 feet per second) to eliminate the sonic crack.

This German-built weapon made world history when it was used against the Black September terrorists during the 1972 Olympic kidnaping. It works on the same basic principle as the Sterling (see above). The West German antiterrorists have probably developed the widest range of weapons and techniques outside Israel, primarily due to an enormous budget and excellent craftsmen. The machinists of Heckler & Koch came from the Mauser factory.

This American-made weapon, carried by "special troops" during the Vietnam war, has a variety of uses--for sniping, assault and even grenade launching (it has an 11.5-inch barrel for that very purpose). Although no longer being manufactured, the XM177 submachine gun series (with three collapsible-stock variants) is still in wide use among antiterrorist troops.

When a sniper fires his rifle, one of the key factors in success is the steadiness of his hand. This sniping rifle, which is extremely popular among German antiterrorists, has a very precise trigger adjustment. It is a modified version of a standard German rifle called the G3 and is considered one of the finest sniper rifles available.

There's much confusion about silenced weapons. Some have true silencers, which tend to require low-velocity small-caliber ammunition, whereas others have suppressors that merely reduce the muzzle blast and confuse the enemy about the location of the sound. The American-made weapon pictured here is a truly silenced pistol--one that reportedly has found covert use on both sides of the terrorist wars.

Like most Israeli weapons, the 5.56mm Galil is ingenious in design: Built into the rifle, for example, are a bottle opener (just forward of the magazine) and a barbed-wire cutter (part of the bipod mechanism). The rifle has a grenade launcher and an illuminated front sight for night shooting. This weapon fires 650 rounds per minute at 3000 feeet per second and was used to free the hostages at Entebbe