The Terror Next Time

The Eight Men huddled in a slowly moving post-office truck on Constitution Avenue and checked their machine guns, nervously pulling at their hoods. The thought that they might not survive was sobering, but they knew how important this raid was. The Americans would learn a lesson they would never forget.

Inside the U.S. Capitol, the Senators were gathering for an evening session. The Majority Leader was eager to get the revenue bill passed. Several Democrats were threatening a filibuster. No matter how it turned out, it was going to be a long night.

In the cloakrooms, Senators were cheerful. The "club" was forming. Old, familiar faces beamed as lawmakers chatted in groups of three and four. Some dropped into easy chairs to watch the end of the evening news. Some scanned the newspapers.

Inside the truck, the terrorists' leader peered through a slit for the fifth time in a minute. The large, heavy trucks typically blocking each entrance to the Capitol grounds on weekends were absent this Thursday evening. There were guards about, but very few of them, and they carried only revolvers. Nowhere could the leader see any kind of automatic heavy-caliber weapons. He shook his head. How smug they were.

The traffic began to thin out. The leader whispered into his hand-held radio. The reply from the lookouts came back. There were no troops nearby. Several U.S. Capitol Police squad cars gathered in front of the Capitol. That was all. Despite the months of training he had put in with his team, the leader couldn't suppress a twinge of apprehension. Could it be this easy?

The truck's engine roared. The vehicle raced up the driveway. In a well-rehearsed series of motions, the terrorists jumped out of the rear of the truck, killing several police officers at an identification check point. Bursts of machine-gun fire downed two charging Capitol guards. The terrorists ran over the bodies into the building, screaming, shooting everyone in sight. Indiscriminate slaughter was part of the plan. The deaths would show how serious they were. The confusion they caused was their ally.

In seconds, the terrorists burst into the cloakroom. One Senator who rose to face them was shot down by one of the younger terrorists. Another was wounded before the leader could reach the cloakroom and calm his seven nervous comrades. They covered the doors and windows. The captive Senators were forced into one corner of the room, while three hooded terrorists entered bearing a large wooden crate. The leader smiled. It had been so easy.

News of the events on Capitol Hill was slow in coming. Reporters had been just a few steps away, in the Press Gallery, when the shooting started. One went to the door and looked quickly into the Senate chamber. Closing the door, he ran to the telephone to call his newspaper. "It sounds like shooting in the Senate cloakroom," he said. The editor at the other end of the line called the police.

The FBI didn't find out for four minutes. The call came into the Emergency Operations Center, on the sixth floor of the FBI building. The duty officer was alone in the three-room complex. There were immediate links, through the computers and telephones spotted throughout the center, with the White House, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, the Federal Aviation Administration and all U.S. security agencies. But not with the U.S. Senate. During the Los Angeles Olympics, the Emergency Operations Center had been staffed with the best agents the FBI could muster--tonight was a different story.

The duty officer made a decision. He would make two calls.

"We have a report that some group has forced its way into the Senate," he said tersely. "There has been shooting and hostage taking."

At the other end of the line was an operations officer with the National Security Council at the White House. During the next three minutes, the President's Chief of Staff and the Advisor for National Security Affairs were alerted.

A second, identical call was placed to the agency's hostage-rescue team. The Pentagon's military counterterrorism team in Fayetteville, North Carolina, was also engaged.

The duty officer knew that this crack team had been secretly sent abroad several times to carry out defensive counterterrorist missions, as well as man hunts. The Italian government had worked with it in the operation that had led to the release of Brigadier General James L. Dozier in 1982. It had been flown to Malta during the Achille Lauro hijacking. But the terrorists had been forced down on Italian soil, and the Italians had indignantly taken custody of the murderers when the Americans had wanted them.

U.S. Capitol Police were already on the scene when the duty officer completed his call. They surrounded the Capitol building while a SWAT team determined the exact location of the cloakroom within the Senate chambers, the number of terrorists and hostages and the type of firepower with which the authorities were dealing. The military group was airborne, its arrival expected in 40 minutes. The FBI had gathered a scratch team, and it arrived at the building within 20 minutes. All those efforts, of course, came too late--much too late.

The terrorists sent out a message. They intended to kill a U.S. Senator every hour until their demands were met....

But even worse news was to come. The Government had sent out its Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) in a helicopter. The sensitive radiation-detection equipment aboard registered the presence of two and one half pounds of plutonium. The crate the terrorists had brought with them contained a crude but effective nuclear device. If the FBI or the SWAT team rushed the Capitol, the terrorists announced, they would set off the bomb....

Stop.

All of the above, of course, is fiction. But it could easily happen. The ingredients for this terrorist attack are present in today's world.

Ten years ago, members of Congress moved easily about their business. Today, strict security precautions constantly remind members and visitors of the risks of terrorism. Congress, through its physical accessibility and its open-door approach to doing business, has always reflected the public nature of our political system. Traditionally, our national Government buildings have been public places.

Today, that tradition is under siege. Any visitor to the Capitol or to a Senate or House Office Building now must pass through metal-detection equipment. Any package, purse, briefcase or handbag is placed under an X-ray scanner. Armed U.S. Capitol Police monitor this equipment, which is located at every public entrance. Visitors find their access to various rooms and halls severely curtailed. A system of identification for Congressional staff has been instituted, and special entrances exist for members and staff who have the proper I.D.

Active American defenses against terrorism have also grown. In recent years, a counterterrorism command post has been established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the event of a significant threat of attack or an actual terrorist operation against the United States, FBI counterefforts will be coordinated from this control center.

Another arm of the American counterterrorism apparatus is the FBI's hostage-rescue team, an elite corps of, approximately 50 agents. This team was in place in Los Angeles as the Olympic games began and was on alert during the Democratic and Republican conventions, as well as the recent Statue of Liberty celebration. FBI director William H. Webster describes this force as a "civilian-response alternative" to calling on the armed forces in the event of a terrorist attack demanding a quick, armed response.

Without question, the most dangerous and unsettling terrorist crisis would be nuclear blackmail here in the United States, forced upon our Government by a group of terrorists with a crude nuclear device. In that event, NEST would be activated. Utilizing sensitive radiation-detection equipment, NEST helicopters and ground vehicles would comb the area suspected of containing the nuclear device.

Internationally, America's Special Operations Forces remain on constant alert. Key units are at the disposal of the Army and Navy and are located throughout the United States, as well as in Germany, Scotland, Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

With a few exceptions, the terrorist threat here in the United States has come from U.S.-based groups, some of which have foreign connections. Organizations such as the Posse Comitatus, the Aryan Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, the Weather Underground, the F.A.L.N., the Armed Resistance Unit and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia have been responsible for bombings and shootings that have resulted in death and injury to Americans. The Jewish Defense League, whose philosophy and methods are opposed by all responsible Jewish organizations, has also committed a number of terrorist acts here at home. The FBI has made significant inroads against these groups. F.A.L.N. operatives in the Chicago area were apprehended several years ago through an unlikely event. An Evanston woman noticed a group of joggers smoking cigarettes while standing around a van. She thought it suspicious for joggers to be smoking and called the police. Her call led to the arrest of ten members of the F.A.L.N. and the uncovering of evidence of further terrorist plans.

FBI sources maintain that there were seven terrorist incidents in the United (continued on page 122)

Terror Next Time(continued from page 98)

States and Puerto Rico in 1985. Bombings in Northridge and Santa Ana, California, Paterson, New Jersey, and Brentwood, New York, were credited to the Jewish extremists. Two others--the January 25, 1985, attack with a light antitank weapon on the United States Court House and a similar attack against FBI headquarters, both in San Juan, Puerto Rico--were carried out by Puerto Rican revolutionaries. Another bombing was carried out by the Red Guerrilla Resistance in New York City on February 23, 1985.

The President said in a 1986 news conference that the United States had prevented about 126 terrorist incidents during 1985. Of these, 23 were in the United States, according to the FBI. State Department officials indicate that the rest of the incidents had occurred abroad and were aimed at American citizens, U.S. embassies or our diplomatic personnel.

Most of those 23 planned acts of terrorism in 1985 involved domestic groups. In the Northeast and Washington, D.C., 14 bombings were prevented through seizure of explosives. The FBI had significant success in foiling an elaborate plot to assassinate Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi during his June 11, 1985, visit to the United States, uncovering a training program designed to acquaint Sikh extremists with the use of firearms and explosives. Our Government also located the mercenary training camp in Alabama where two Sikhs had received instruction. New Orleans police ultimately arrested seven Sikh extremists on conspiracy charges related to explosives and firearms, as well as solicitation to assassinate a foreign official.

Another assassination plot involving foreign nationals on American soil was broken up in late 1984. Eight Hondurans were arrested in Miami for planning the murder of Honduran ex-president Roberto Suazo Cordova. The FBI also found evidence of a planned coup d'état against the government of Honduras, involving former Honduran general José Bueso Rosa.

The Libyan connection in this country has been evident for some time now. In December 1983, a Libyan national sought automatic weapons and silencers from an FBI agent posing as a supplier. The Libyan later admitted his intention to carry out an assassination with the weapons.

On May 9, 1984, Bashir Baesho and Mehdi Hitewesh, two Libyan students, were arrested in Philadelphia after purchasing handguns with silencers. They were fined and sentenced.

In January of this year, the Mexican government intercepted four Libyan nationals after a tip-off that they were headed for the United States. Following that incident, authorities in El Paso apprehended three suspected terrorists. Their nationalities remain undisclosed.

The reform of American immigration laws is increasingly becoming a genuine national-security concern. Dr. Ray Cline, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, believes that the present flood of immigration brings us a number of good American citizens. But, regrettably, "sleeper agents" are also gaining entry into the United States, he says, and these individuals are prepared to develop the cell system necessary to carry out a concerted terrorist attack against the United States.

Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi has referred to this type of Libyan hit-squad activity on numerous occasions. Fortunately, U.S. authorities were able to prevent one such incident in June 1985, when 16 individuals known to be planning terrorist attacks on American soil were refused entry into the United States by the FBI, in cooperation with our border authorities. Generally, however, once these individuals enter the country, preventing the development of terrorist groups is difficult.

One counterterrorism policy that has shown some success is the collecting of intelligence on underground terrorist groups from anti-Qaddafi or anti-Khomeini factions within Libyan and Iranian communities in America. FBI director Webster, in describing these efforts, said recently, "We are developing a significant informant base. It's difficult to penetrate terrorist organizations. They are small. They're cellular. But by using informants, we are able to gather additional data."

Both Libya and Iran have established contact with extremist groups in the United States. Iran, particularly, has links to the Islamic Guerrillas of America, a group involved in the 1980 Bethesda, Maryland, murder of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, a former Iranian diplomat.

Libya's brand of state-sponsored terrorism extends into the United Nations. Farhat Tebar, a Libyan representative to the UN, was essentially declared persona non grata by the Department of State. FBI agents uncovered his involvement in a plot to assassinate opponents of the Qaddafi regime living in the U.S.

We face a different kind of battle when our Government confronts international terrorism. Many domestic terrorist groups do not have the resources or the sponsors to mount the deadly attacks our allies in Europe and the Middle East experience regularly. International terrorists, however, such as Mohammed Abbas and Abu Nidal, with their strong links to Libyan, Iranian, Syrian, Cuban and, ultimately, Soviet support networks, are professionals. They have the greatest access to logistic and financial assistance from their state sponsors.

Several of the Islamic Shiite groups, such as the Jihad and Hizbollah, have repeatedly declared their intentions to "bring the battle to America." As terrorist attacks on Americans abroad continue to increase and terrorist "successes" continue in the absence of an effective international defense, we must consider the possibility of dealing with international terrorists here in the United States.

Robert Kupperman, of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, acknowledges FBI successes in weakening the domestic terrorist networks of the Ku Klux Klan, the Aryan Nations, the Posse Comitatus and the F.A.L.N. But when serious international terrorism comes to American soil, as it inevitably will, Kupperman says, we are unprepared to deal with it.

Kupperman believes that the United States has an intelligence problem. A terrorist infrastructure, tightly organized and extremely difficult to identify or keep under surveillance, exists in this nation today. With hundreds of individuals currently under FBI surveillance, the bureau is experiencing manpower difficulties as it works to identify an intricate cell system organized by sleeper agents already in place.

Statistically, the international-terrorist threat is growing. According to the State Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism, there were more than 800 international-terrorist incidents in 1985, with 2223 casualties. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who directs the State Department's antiterrorism effort, says that these figures represent a 60 percent increase over the 1978-1983 yearly average.

The trend is clear--and disturbing. Efforts at improving security in many foreign countries are well under way. However, as West European governments increasingly improve their own security against terrorism, and as the United States is able to follow through on security enhancements for our embassies abroad, Dr. Cline and Kupperman believe that international terrorism may be deflected toward the United States itself. Unfortunately, America is not as well prepared for dealing with this type of threat as many other countries are.

Once an attack occurs, U.S. defensive measures must complement one another smoothly. Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian, at Loyola University of Chicago, has looked closely at our ability to defend ourselves against a professional, well-financed (continued on page 156)Terror next time(continued from page 122) international terrorist attack in the United States. He believes that American defenses must improve. The range of agencies charged with counterterrorism is fragmented and lacks coordination.

Many specific local units, such as the New York and Chicago police departments, are prepared for counterterrorism. The difficulties begin, Dr. Sarkesian says, when our defenses against a terrorist attack require harmony within the chain of command. Responsibilities and command become fragmented when counterterrorism efforts enlarge in scope, as they inevitably will in response to a major attack.

Sarkesian would create a single point of authority against terrorism, with direct access to the President and the National Security Council. A clear national command authority, he says, offers the coordination and flexibility crucial to fighting terrorism successfully. It also represents the high priority the United States must attach to fighting terrorism.

The Vice-President's Task force on Combating Terrorism has taken positive steps. The creation of a full-time National Security Council position to deal solely with America's counterterrorism efforts is a good idea and is long overdue. The task force has also recommended necessary steps toward improving our abilities in the intellingence field.

Sarkesian would like to see policies that offer American intelligence agencies more flexibility in identifying and uncovering terrorist plots before they become a reality. Congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois has urged the creation of a single, joint Intelligence Oversight Committee in Congress. A streamilined, effective congressional intelligence body could play a key role in increasing the ability of our intelligence agencies to combat terrorism.

The American public lacks a sufficient understanding of the terrorist threat. As Sarkesian has pointed out, a lack of general public knowledge plays into the hands of terrorists.

U.S. interests abroad represent the prime target for terrorist attacks. However, a calculated international attack against the United States at home would wreak havoc. America is not psychologically prepared for a major bombing in Washington, New York, Los Angeles or Chicago. As Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation has pointed out, a Middle East--based terrorist group, well financed and well organized, would not risk coming to American soil simply to blow up a few pipe bombs. An attack of this type would necessarily be a major one, and it would shock our nation's leaders and citizens far more than any attack on Americans abroad.

A successful counterterrorism policy requires cooperation. During the May summit in Tokyo, the allies pledged further cooperation against terrorism. Leaders of the seven industrial nations agreed to suspend arms exports to nations that support terrorism and to limit the size of diplomatic and consular missions such as Qaddafi's People's Bureaus, improve extradition procedures, tighten immigration laws and promote multilateral cooperation among police and security organizations.

The United States went to great lengths in soliciting European economic and political cooperation against Libya. But effective, multilateral cooperation did not result, and we essentially acted alone by declaring sanctions against the Qaddafi regime. As Libya's blatant support for terrorism continued, American appeals for cooperation and assistance continued to be ignored.

The Libya raid was not precipitate. I supported this decision to attack terrorist-related targets in Libya. In the short term, the world will certainly observe a vengeful Qaddafi. We have already heard his rhetoric. U.S. actions, however, have demonstrated that continued support for international terrorism will have costs.

Qaddafi has placed himself in the unenviable position of the easy mark. His actions and rhetoric have alienated Libya's Arab neighbors. He is a loose cannon in the region. Libya is the Soviet Union's largest trading partener in the Arab world and one of its largest military client states. Yet the Soviet leadership has kept Qaddafi at arm's length. Indeed, Soviet naval-intelligence ships in the Mediterranean evidently failed to warn him of the impending U.S. attack.

Several West European nations have strong financial and commercial ties to the Qaddafi regime. Unfortunately, those connections go even deeper. It was reported that throughout the Seventies, France and Italy made secret deals with Libya to insulate their citizens from Qaddafi- and P.L.O.-sponsored attacks. The result of these arrangements was that known terrorists passed through French airports under the watchful eyes of French security personnel. It was claimed that Italian and Libyan intelligence officials cooperated as well, though an Italian-embassy spokesman in Washington denies that that government has ever dealt with terrorists.

The Tokyo summit was a disappointment. We succeeded only in labeling Qaddafi a terrorist, but we clearly need more than labels to combat terrorism. I have introduced legislation in the Senate urging the President to convene an International Congress of Terrorism to develop cooperative, multinational programs for locating, apprehending and bringing to justice those responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent people. On a broader level, America must develop with its allies strategies to isolate state sponsors of terrorism, strategies to cut financial and commercial ties with terrorist regimes.

At home, we need three things: awareness, confidence and determination.

• The American public, Government leaders and Government agencies must develop an awareness that terrorist attacks within the United States are inevitable and extremely dangerous. Intelligence operations to identify and prevent terrorist plots must be implemented. We must also develop a system of coordination among all agencies involved to ensure that this preventive program works.

• We must maintain our confidence that we can, indeed, combat terrorism. In Washington, there is talk of erecting a barricade around the U.S. Capitol grounds. I think this would be a mistake. It would send the wrong message to terrorists. An antiterrorist barrier around the greatest institutional symbol of democratic rule would represent not strength but capitulation and defeat. The goal of a terrorist is to create fear, and by sealing off the Capitol grounds, we confirm that fear.

• Our determination to prevent terrorism must not waver. Whether terrorism are plotting violent acts abroad or at home, we must resolve to find out about them and thwart them.

Our democratic way of life, in short, must never take a back seat to terrorism. A firm, consistent posture against those guilty of it, combined with active defenses against its perpetrators, should form a basis for an effective antiterrorism policy.

If we are successful in our efforts, then my scenario in the U.S. Senate cloakroom will very likely never occur. Our goal should be to make certain that such a scenario will not take place anywhere in America--ever.

"The FBI is experiencing manpower difficulties in identifying sleeper agents already in place."