Israel's General Sharon: As Tough as Ever

Ariel (Arik) Sharon is perhaps the most flamboyant and controversial figure in the Israeli cabinet today. During his service in combat, he, more than anyone else, was responsible for the efficiency and high standards of the Israeli military ground forces. His opinions are studied in military schools all over the world. He brought into politics his sweeping new ideas that united several middle and right-wing parties into the one "Likud" party that was eventually voted into power in Israel on May 17, 1977.

Sharon was rewarded by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who appointed him minister of agriculture and, even more important, chairman of the ministers' committee of new Israeli settlements.

It is now widely thought that General Sharon turned an Israeli disaster on the Egyptian front during the October 1973 war into a triumph by initiating his forceful and daring crossings of the Suez Canal, thereby encircling the entire Egyptian armies, which became dependent on U. S. diplomacy to save them from Israeli revenge. Literally every tank and truck that marched through the Sinai in those days of October carried graffiti painted on it saying: Arik is King of Israel.

If anything should happen to Prime Minister Begin, Sharon would be one of the three or four equal front-runners for his position as prime minister of Israel. He is a combination of a clear-cut Israeli right-winger with a sensitive feeling for human rights. While advocating continuing control of the West Bank of the Jordan, he would not tolerate any mishandling of the Arabs of that region. His ideas are swift and very far-reaching and expose him to criticism and even ridicule--but, as he told me: "That was always the case, but when my ideas were executed, they always succeeded."

The first portion of the interview was conducted November 7, 1977, in Tel Aviv.

[Q] Lurie: You began by saying you would probably be attacked in the press for this interview and that you consider the media to be hostile to you in general.

[A] Sharon: I am attacked regularly by the media. For many years, there has been this tendency: "Keep Sharon within bounds until war comes; then we can use him as we have before. But until then, let him mind his own business." This has been a constant point of view that is not applied to any other person in Israel. The Israeli media have not used such harsh criticisms against anyone else so consistently. Yet when I do speak out on controversial subjects, I am often proved correct.

[Q] Lurie: For instance?

[A] Sharon: When I advocated Jewish settlements in Arab territories, I was criticized and condemned immediately. After these settlements were established, they were praised. When I developed new military tactics in the Fifties, they were criticized; but, afterward, the Israeli army adopted those very methods. And, incidentally, I now feel many of those methods should again be changed and renovated--but they have not been.

[A] While I am considered by the media and the public to be an extremist--and I confess I cannot succeed in fighting that image--I was the first, and perhaps the only one, to propose a solution to the Arab-refugee problem after the Six-Day War. I went to then--Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and suggested that he declare his intention of resolving the problem once and for all--at least insofar as the refugees in Israeli-controlled areas were concerned. I made my suggestions several times, but they were rejected.

[Q] Lurie: As of this date, you seem to be the only person in the Israeli government who claims to have a workable solution to the Palestinian problem. Other Israeli leaders with whom I spoke seem to have a blind spot on this issue. For instance, you have said that if it were up to you, you would recognize a Palestinian entity in principle. Are you ready to elaborate?

[A] Sharon: Today I am a member of the cabinet, and anything I could say would damage the official stand of the government. Therefore, I have to avoid saying the specific things I said in the past, even though I still believe in them. But I do want to say a few things. First and foremost, the problem must be resolved. But to clarify the issue, we'd better identify the people we're talking about, both in Israel and in Jordan.

[A] Until 1922, Palestine and Jordan were one state. In that year, for a purely artificial reason--to provide a shelter for the Hashimite royal family--Palestine was divided and the Hashimite court established itself in Jordan. The situation today is that the area west of the Jordan River has a Jewish plurality; in Jordan--east of the river--a Palestinian plurality. Of 1,500,000 people in Jordan, more than 1,000,000 are Palestinian Arabs. They are not refugees but citizens of Jordan. They are the same Arabs who lived on the West Bank.

[A] This is a starting point for the coming arrangement. There is a tragedy here: For the Jews, this is their homeland. There is no question about it. The Arabs also, at least some of them, lived here for hundreds of years.

[Q] Lurie: Thousands of years, you mean.

[A] Sharon: No, no. Hundreds of years. There are many Arabs who came here during the last century, but, unlike the Jews, they were not coming to their homeland, since for a Jew this is his homeland. It is not important where a Jew lives in the world. Israel is his homeland. Jewish settlements were here for 2000 years, since the destruction of the Second Temple.

[Q] Lurie: But let me point out that there were Arab villages in Palestine during all those years, too.

[A] Sharon: (a long pause): This is the crux of the tragedy. This is the Jewish homeland and the Arabs, too, lived here for hundreds of years. I don't deny it. The only foreign body in the area is the Hashimite royalty, King Hussein.

[Q] Lurie: Whose family came from the region that is now Saudi Arabia.

[A] Sharon: And so the real tragedy is that the Arab leader who has long been considered the most moderate is, in fact, the obstacle.

[Q] Lurie: In other words, if King Hussein did not exist, in your opinion, Jordan would be the Palestinian homeland.

[A] Sharon (a long pause): That was the idea of partition. Jews would live west of the Jordan River, Arabs east of it.

[Q] Lurie: So what is there to do, considering that King Hussein enjoys strong support from the U. S.?

[A] Sharon: That's why I say it's a tragedy. A Palestinian state already exists, and only its leader, King Hussein, is not Palestinian. Many government leaders in Jordan are Palestinian Arabs, and they represent the West Bank Arabs just as much as, if not more than, the P.L.O. does. What is important is to stress that there is a Palestinian state today. And this Israel does not emphasize enough.

[Q] Lurie: Yet in 1970, the threat of Israeli tanks probably saved King Hussein from a Palestinian take-over.

[A] Sharon: Well, there were different opinions on that topic. There was a forceful debate on that.

[Q] Lurie: Between whom?

[A] Sharon (uncomfortably): There was an argument... . It is very possible that Israel should not have made her moves in 1970--even though Israel did not intervene militarily. [Israel moved her tanks to the Jordanian borders--a warning that observers feel was crucial in deterring the P.L.O. and the Syrians.] And maybe--I emphasize maybe--she was requested to intervene by the United States.

[Q] Lurie: Itzhak Rabin, when he was prime minister, told me that when he was the Israeli ambassador in Washington, he served as the liaison that was instrumental in Israel's acting upon the Americans' requests [to send Israeli tanks to the border].

[A] Sharon: OK. This you know from Rabin. And if you want to quote Rabin on the subject, I approve of it. However, Israel's actions then caused King Hussein to survive.

[Q] Lurie: So, according to your thesis, if Hussein had fallen in 1970, and a purely Palestinian state had been established, the problem would have been solved?

[A] Sharon: Palestinians have a state today; Jordan, as I have said, is actually a Palestinian state. But what I felt would happen if Hussein had fallen is that the Palestinians would have been given a political expression.

[Q] Lurie: A flag?

[A] Sharon: Yes, a flag, a political entity, statehood. My argument [that of backing the P.L.O. against King Hussein--R.L.] was not accepted. But I was not the only one who supported that approach.

[Q] Lurie: Other government leaders did, as well?

[A] Sharon: Yes, but the other argument prevailed because of the feeling that it would have created a hostile, extremist state to the east of Israel, as opposed to the relatively quiet cooperation we had with King Hussein between wars. I must admit these were important arguments, but, of course, it's just as possible that such a Palestinian state would have developed in a totally different way.

[A] There is also the question of whether or not the Palestinian Arabs would have been satisfied with only Jordan. And the only answer I can give is, no, they would not have been satisfied. But at least that state and Israel could have discussed the common problem of the West Bank Arabs. It could even come to a point where relations between the Palestinian state and Israel could turn into a confederation, or even a federation... . There is no short-range solution, but the long-range process needs some kind of beginning. And the beginning could be an Israeli state west of the Jordan River and a Palestinian state east of it.

[Q] Lurie: But if you were a Palestinian Arab, would you be satisfied with a Palestinian state east of the Jordan? After all is said and done, the Jews also were offered the right to settle in Argentina and in Uganda, and they refused. Apparently, there is an emotional factor, and it's not enough to have just a piece of land somewhere. If you were a Palestinian Arab, would you be a member of the P.L.O.?

[A] Sharon (another pause): Look ... in my eyes, the Bashan, the Gilad [large fertile parts of Jordan] and Jordan are part of the land of Israel.

[Q] Lurie: Jewish Israel?

[A] Sharon: Jewish Israel. But I recognize the existing political reality. We have relinquished our claims on the kingdom of Jordan [the East Bank]. And the West Bank we are not annexing officially. Israel is living in that area and holding it for her own security. The Arabs of the West Bank will become either Israeli or Jordanian--or Palestinian, if Jordan turns out to be a Palestinian state. The main problem is to learn how to live together. No one will be able to force Israel to execute a short-term move that will endanger her existence. No one can do it. It would be an illusion to think that Israel would accept such a thing.

[A] If I emphasize the security reason, you can ask, Why establish settlements in the West Bank? First, there can be no situation in which Arabs can live anywhere in the land of Israel but Jews cannot. Half a million Arabs already lived in Israel before the Six-Day War. They are Israeli citizens, and even privileged citizens, since not all the obligations are enforced on them. They don't serve in the military. They don't even pay taxes by the same standards that Jewish citizens of Israel pay taxes, but they do have their representatives in the Knesset. Thirty thousand West Bank Arabs--and I would prefer to use the expression Judaea and Samaria rather than the West Bank--have settled in the territory of the pre--Six-Day War Israel, while only 10,000 Jews have settled in the new territories. No one will put obstacles in the way of Jews to live in the new territories. In the land of Israel, Arabs and Jews will live one next to the other. There is no other solution.

[Q] Lurie: Are you concerned about growing Jewish emigration from Israel?

[A] Sharon: No. But that brings up another central problem. If we want Jews to come to Israel and we want to stop Jews from leaving Israel, Israel has to become a special state. I don't think that Israel's being an "ordinary" state will attract Jews and won't stop emigration from Israel. We have to build new settlements, new towns, new airports.

[Q] Lurie: Do you (continued on page 187) General Sharon (continued from page 43) include the West Bank in those plans?

[A] Sharon: In all my plans, I have avoided sending Jews to highly concentrated Arab areas. All the plans are based on settling Jews without confiscating Arab lands. Israel has to be a special state. Jews will not come here because it is safer. We have to know how to show the flag. This government won't be able to survive, either, if it deals only with pragmatic things.

[Q] Lurie: What of the changing role of the U.S. in the Mideast? With increasing reliance on the Arab oil establishment, doesn't that mean that Israel will eventually come under some pressure from its primary ally?

[A] Sharon: I would prefer not to comment on the President's oil policy. However, Israel will not pay the price of American oil. Absolutely not. It will be a mistake to demand that Israel accept a challenge to her existence for the sake of American convenience in solving the oil problem. Oil is not the key to peace or war in the Mideast. The three keys are: Israel's military strength, Israel's remaining free from pressure and Israel's not making promises to the Arabs that cannot be fulfilled. Let the United States solve its problems. If the United States will sacrifice Israel--I say if because I believe in the morality of the United States--it would boomerang. But I don't believe that the United States will pressure Israel. I, by the way, feel that Israel owes nothing to anyone. My evaluation is that the world owes us, the Jewish people.

[Q] Lurie: But American interests dictate, don't they? Recently, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said----

[A] Sharon (impatiently): Israel has all the options to defend itself, and it will defend itself. It will defend itself whether the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wants it or not.

[Q] Lurie: Will Israel be able to defend itself as well within two or three years, when the military build-up in Saudi Arabia is complete?

[A] Sharon: The fact that the United States has become the main arms supplier in the Mideast is a very serious problem, and I warned about it some time ago. In fact, the only real détente that exists between the Soviet Union and the United States is that both nations supply weapons to the Arab states. But I think it would be a mistake on the Arabs' part to think they have a military option that may lead to victory. I hereby advise the Arabs: Don't get involved in a war with Israel. You will lose.

[Q] Lurie: So you would continue to settle the West Bank over the objections of the President of the U. S.?

[A] Sharon (a long pause): Israel must live its life. Sometimes we tend to give exaggerated importance to passing events. I am not undermining the Geneva Conference. I believe in Geneva. But the Jewish people have had dozens of Genevas. King Herod traveled to his Geneva--in Rome. All our history has been made of Genevas. But they are unimportant events--they are peripheral to the problem. The important thing is our survival here. And our survival depends to a very great degree on our settling on the West Bank and the Golan Heights to secure our existence.

[A] Our existence is permanent; the Geneva Conference is temporary. The present U. S. Administration or any other is temporary. Now, I wish President Carter great success. I was the only one here in Israel who clearly criticized Ford's Administration during the 1976 U. S. elections; I also attacked Prime Minister Rabin's government for speaking out on Ford's behalf. But it's not just Israel's existence we are talking about. Without us, I think the Jewish people as a whole would not survive. I see this as a historical responsibility.

[Q] Lurie: But don't you see a conflict between your desire to see a strong Israel and the fact that Israel's strength depends almost entirely on support from the U. S.?

[A] Sharon: If we returned to the 1967 borders, we would have much greater political support from the United States. But within its present borders, which include the West Bank, Israel is definitely more capable of facing difficulties--which I hope the Americans will not impose on us--and if I had to choose, I would choose the second possibility. Israel will not exist in a situation where the West Bank is controlled by someone else.

[Q] Lurie: Because of security?

[A] Sharon: Yes. This is not a choice between a good situation and a bad situation where Israel cannot survive. It is not a question of emotions or religious beliefs; in my case, it's pure analysis. Shellings of Tel Aviv would paralyze life in all of Israel.

[Q] Lurie: You see no possibility for Israel's survival with the 1967 borders?

[A] Sharon: Absolutely not. No, with a capital N. The Israeli government has already said it might compromise on the Sinai, but I see no possibility of negotiation about the West Bank. There must be an Israeli presence on the West Bank, and a presence cannot consist only of military forces--there has to be a presence in terms of day-to-day life.

[Q] Lurie: So the new settlements that have been established on the West Bank will remain, no matter what?

[A] Sharon: During the past 100 years, there has not been a single Jewish settlement that was relinquished because of political considerations. And it is not we Israelis who invented the technique of establishing military strongholds. As I said to U. S. Ambassador Samuel Lewis, I studied about the road signs in America commemorating military forts in the Old West--in which civilians were sent to live.

[Q] Lurie: As a former military man, what is your opinion of the possibility of a U. S. take-over of the Mideast oil fields?

[A] Sharon: I would not want to go into that question. But I do want to say that the Americans missed a great opportunity when the Egyptians cried out for help against us. The U. S. should have seized the opportunity to condition the survival of the Egyptian army on an ironclad guarantee that there would be no further oil embargoes.

[Q] Lurie: Then, getting back to the oil question, don't you think it's a possibility that the Americans may have to sacrifice Israel and say, "We're sorry, but we have to survive, too--and we cannot survive without oil"?

[A] Sharon: One of the problems of gentiles is that they do not know Jews. They don't understand that Jews are a people who can be moved a long way with pressure, but when our actual survival seems endangered, that will be it. Then Israel will do anything in its power to survive.

[Q] Lurie: When you say Jews, are you speaking about the Israeli nation?

[A] Sharon: I have said for many years that we have to begin a wide reorganization of the Jewish nation in all its aspects. We are not 3,000,000 Israelis. We are 15,000,000 Jews.

[Q] Lurie: And do you worry that that idea may raise American doubts as to the loyalty of its Jewish citizens?

[A] Sharon: Jews are different from others.

The final portion of the interview was conducted by telephone, taped with Sharon's permission, on November 23, 1977, following Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel.

[Q] Lurie: The press reported that one of Sadat's first questions when he stepped off the plane at Ben-Gurion Airport was, "Is General Sharon here to meet me?"

[A] Sharon: Yes, that's correct; he asked Prime Minister Begin if I were there.

[Q] Lurie: And when you met him, what did he say?

[A] Sharon: He said, "I wanted to catch you there."

[Q] Lurie: Meaning when you and the troops you commanded were close to Cairo in 1973?

[A] Sharon: Yes. And, of course, we spoke for several hours when he met with the Security Committee of Ministers, but I will not repeat those conversations. Just before his departure from Israel, he was very friendly toward me. He said, "Sharon, it was so good to see you," or something like that. And I told him, "I hope my next visit to Egypt will be in my present role as minister of agriculture."

[Q] Lurie: Since you "visited" Egypt during 1973 at the head of your troops, what would you think if Sadat invited you to Egypt now?

[A] Sharon: I would definitely go and I believe I would be received with full respect. And I would be delighted to receive such an invitation.

[Q] Lurie: Do you think that Sadat's visit puts an obligation on Israel to give something to him in return?

[A] Sharon: Sadat did not want a reward or a compensation for his dramatic gesture. Sadat visited Israel to shorten the whole procedure. He did bring Israel to a point where we must recalculate our moves and come up with some kind of answer. But that would have happened anyway. Sadat did not make it necessary for Israel to give something in return, but perhaps he put us in a situation where we have to decide.

[Q] Lurie: And what will Israel decide? Sadat's stand was unchanged: a return to the 1967 borders, including Arab Jerusalem, and a Palestinian state on the West Bank. Since Prime Minister Begin said everything was negotiable, does that mean any or all of those demands might be met?

[A] Sharon: Negotiating without preconditions simply means that if Sadat says the Arabs want Jerusalem, it doesn't necessarily follow that Israel would refuse to go to Geneva. We will go to Geneva and we will negotiate.

[Q] Lurie: As a private person, rather than as a cabinet minister, do you think there's a chance that Israel might return a portion of Jerusalem--especially since that wouldn't necessarily threaten Israel's survival?

[A] Sharon: I am not a private person nowadays, but, nonetheless, I do not see any possibility that Jerusalem would be partitioned again or that Jerusalem would not continue to be included in Israeli territory. Israel has promised freedom to all religions in Jerusalem, but Jerusalem is and will remain the capital of Israel.

[Q] Lurie: And that means Arab Jerusalem as well?

[A] Sharon: There is no such thing as Arab Jerusalem. There is a Jerusalem.

[Q] Lurie: And the whole city belongs to Israel?

[A] Sharon: Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel. It will remain in Israel. You ask me as a private person and I answer you that way.

[Q] Lurie: What about the question of a Palestinian state on the West Bank?

[A] Sharon: Israel has repeated again and again that it will not allow a Palestinian state in Judaea and Samaria [the West Bank]. Israel did say it would talk with the Palestinian Arabs who live there about their future. There already is a Palestinian state: Jordan.

[Q] Lurie: We covered that in the first portion of the interview, before Sadat visited Israel. My question now is whether or not his visit changed your views on that subject.

[A] Sharon: No; my answer is no.

[Q] Lurie: Do you feel that Israel has to make any kind of concession to Egypt in order to strengthen Sadat's position in the Arab world?

[A] Sharon: Israel does not have to make any concession to strengthen Sadat's position. Sadat came to Israel to shorten the route to Geneva. No gesture from us will strengthen his position.

[Q] Lurie: So your political views haven't changed as a result of the visit?

[A] Sharon: No, nothing has changed except for the fact that we have to move more quickly. I think we have to make any effort possible to come to an arrangement. However, when I say "arrangement," it means on conditions that do not risk the survival of Israel. And only Israel will be able to determine what endangers its existence.

[Q] Lurie: What if Yasir Arafat of the P.L.O. were to ask to visit Israel? Would you recommend that the government invite him?

[A] Sharon: No.

[Q] Lurie: So what were the benefits of Sadat's visit if your own views remain so unchanged?

[A] Sharon: First, a direct contact was established. As long as that direct contact had not been made, we Israelis were serving the interest of a third power. Next----

[Q] Lurie: By third power, you mean the U. S.?

[A] Sharon: Certainly. I don't want to undermine the U. S. efforts at achieving peace in the Mideast, but this sort of direct contact between us and the Arabs largely neutralizes results that could serve interests other than ours. The next point is that we created a network of personal acquaintances--credibility and trust were established. And that leads to the final benefit, which is to prevent war due to misunderstanding. That is very important. War may break out over disagreements, but not now due to misunderstanding. In the unofficial talks we have had with Egyptians, it turns out they now feel the Six-Day War broke out as a result of a misunderstanding. When Nasser demanded that the UN peace-keeping forces that were stationed there in 1967 immediately evacuate the area, he did not expect then-Secretary General U Thant to take him seriously. The Egyptians told us privately that Nasser was perplexed when U Thant agreed to pull the UN troops out. Due to the contacts established by Sadat's visit, such confusion or misunderstanding cannot happen again. And that is a very, very important achievement.

Ranan R. Lurie is an internationally syndicated political analyst and cartoonist and a contributor to Playboy.

"Israel will not exist in a situation where the West Bank is controlled by someone else."